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1 Introduction
In this work we will study an interbank market model, which is based on a model used
in an ECB working paper by Heider and Hoerova [15]. There is no doubt about the
importance of interbank markets as a way to smooth out different liquidity levels of
banks without intervention of a central bank. There are various markets for different
durations of the credits. We are interested in the different interest rates on secured and
unsecured markets and therefore consider one fixed time horizon in this work. During the
financial crisis, the spread between the various rates has increased significantly, which is
why we try to model this spread and try to analyze in which way it depends on liquidity
shocks for individual banks.
A version of the model we study has been discussed by Freixas and Holthausen [12].
This paper is one of a series of papers on the topic of liquidity, risk and in particular the
effects on inetrbank markets ([10], [11], [12], [15], [16], [17]).
An interbank market of the type at hand has been introduced by Diamond and Dy-
bvig [8] and Bhattacharya and Gale [2]. The interbank markets and interest rates are
determined by a Walrasian auction. There are various papers, which discuss equilibria
in the sense of Walras or an adapted version thereof. An introduction and discussion
of the Walrasian approach is given by Katzner [21]. A general article on auctions and
equilibria, as well as applications, was published by de Vries and Vohra [7].
Walras described an equilibrium and showed properties of equilibrium prices, but did
not address the question of existence of such an equilibrium. Among many others,
Arrow and Debreu [1] discuss the existence of an equilibrium. There are two established
modifications of the classical Walras equilibrium, the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium
and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. They are described and compared in a work by
Julien [19]. Codognato and Gabsewicz [5] discuss Cournot-Walras equilibria in markets
with a continuum of traders. An early example, where a continuum of traders is used, is
a paper by Diamond and Dybvig [8]. This is particularly relevant, since we will assume
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to have a continuum of agents (i.e. banks) as well.
Our model goes als follows: We consider a continuum of identical banks maximizing
expected utility of their terminal wealth in a three-period model (t = 0, t1, t2). There
are households, which have future liquidity needs (in t1 and t2) and therefore let banks
manage their funds.
In t = 0, banks can invest households’ funds in riskless bonds and a risky investment.
Those investments can only be liquidated in t = t2. The remaining funds can be stored
at no cost, i.e. there is a riskless interest-free asset, which can be accessed at any time.
We will refer to this asset as the liquid asset. The risky investment is assumed to have
a higher expected return than the bonds. It represents a combination of loans, venture
capital investments and stock investments. In contrast to usual models, the t2-value of
the investment is determined independently for each bank. The distribution of the value
is the same for all banks. Thus there is a tradeoff between liquidity and return as well
as a tradeoff between expected return and risk.
In t1 and t2, the banks have to satisfy the households’ liquidity needs. Every house-
hold can withdraw an arbitrary fraction of its funds in t1. We assume that only the
distribution of those withdrawals are known, but not the exact amount for every bank.
Since the bonds and the risky investment cannot be liquidated in t1, the withdrawals
have to be paid out of the liquid asset. Without a possibility to smooth out the different
levels of liquidity demand between the banks, every bank has to hold an amount of
liquid asset, which covers the highest possible withdrawal in t1. This obviously harms
the return in t2.
Therefore, we introduce two interbank markets, a secured one and an unsecured one.
The security on the secured market would typically be bonds, thus we allow an outright
sale of bonds. This is easier to handle and yields equivalent results.
As in [15], the interest rates will be determined by a Walras-type auction. We will
derive results for a very general case, thus we will define a generalization of the classical
Walras equilibrium theory in chapter 2. This is necessary, since the most common gener-
alizations, namely the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilib-
rium, do not fit our needs perfectly. In some aspects, we need a more general formulation,
in other aspects we need to consider a more special situation.
In chapter 3, we will specify the mathematical setup for our model and give an overview
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over the three-period market.
The core of this work will be chapter 3, where we will derive criteria for the de-
velopment of an unsecured interbank market as well as a formula for the unsecured
interest rate. This will be made with little to no assumptions on the distributions of
t1-withdrawals and return on the risky investment.
In the last chapter, we will discuss optimal portfolios in t = 0 by means of certain
examples. Since only very few general results can be shown, the distributions of t1-
withdrawals and return on the risky investment will be specified.
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2 A generalized Walras equilibrium
In this section, we will generalize the classical Walras equilibrium theory. We start from
the trivial classical situation and generalize exactly the parts we consider necessary. We
introduce a way to deal with non-unique demand functions and allow for situations where
the buying price for a certain good exceeds its selling price. We add external cashflows
to the model and introduce storage of excess capital as well as lending between agents.
Finally, instead of limiting the model to a finite number of agents, we let the set of
agents be arbitrary. Even uncountable sets will be possible.
2.1 Classical Walras equilibrium
First of all, let us recap the Walras equilibrium for a market with n agents and m goods.
Let n ≥ 2 be the number of agents on the market, m ≥ 2 the number of goods on the
market and wji agent i’s initial endowment of good j, measured in units of the respective
good (i = 1, . . . n; j = 1, . . .m). The auction is held as follows: First, the auctioneer
announces a price m-tuple for the goods, then the agents state their demand for each
good given those prices. We denote by dji (p1, . . . , pm) the demand function of agent i
for good j given prices p1, . . . , pm (i=1,. . . n; j=1,. . .m). If the market clears (aggregate
demand equals aggregate initial endowment for each good), then the announced price
m-tuple is an equilibrium price m-tuple. Else, the auctioneer adjusts the prices (raise
prices for goods where aggregate demand surpassed aggregate initial endowment; lower
prices for goods where aggregate demand was lower than aggregate initial endowment)
and the process is repeated. Thus by definition, an equilibrium price m-tuple p∗1, . . . , p
∗
m
satisfies
n∑
i=1
d
j
i (p
∗
1, . . . , p
∗
m) =
n∑
i=1
w
j
i , for all j = 1, . . .m.
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2.2 Modifications
2.2.1 Multiple demand functions
Assuming that demand is uniquely determined by a given price m-tuple is not reason-
able. From an agent’s point of view, demand depends on a utility function and the
initial endowment. In general, the agents’ utility functions allow for multiple optimal
allocations. Thus, we replace the demand functions by a set of functions, namely the
optimal order sets. Let f i : Rm → R be the reward function, mapping an allocation
(x1, . . . , xm) of goods to its numerical value to the i-th agent. Every agent’s preferences
are included in this reward function. We assume, that f i is increasing in every ele-
ment. The function f i may depend on the price m-tuple (p1, . . . , pm), a typical choice
is f i(x1, . . . , xm) = U
i(
∑m
j=1 pjxj) where U
i is a utility function.
Definition 2.1. Let (p1, . . . , pm) be fixed. The optimal order set of agent i is the set
Oi = Oi(p1, . . . , pm) ⊂ R
m
≥0, s.t. every x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ O
i satisfies
• budget constraint:
∑m
j=1 pjxj =
∑m
j=1 pjw
j
i ,
• optimality:
f i(x) = max
(y1,...,ym)∈Rm≥0
f i(y1, . . . , ym).
By stating an optimal order set, the agent agrees with being assigned an arbitrary
x ∈ Oi. It is now up to the auctioneer to assign to every agent an allocation out of his
order set such that the market clears. The following definition provides all possible ways
to do so.
Definition 2.2. Let (p1, . . . , pm) be fixed. An optimal market-clearing assignment
is a function
a : {1, . . . , n} → Rm≥0, i 7→ (a1(i), . . . , am(i)),
such that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
a(i) ∈ Oi
and the market clearing conditions hold:
n∑
i=1
aj(i) =
n∑
i=1
w
j
i , j = 1, . . . ,m.
If such a function exists, we call (p1, . . . , pm) an equilibrium price m-tuple.
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If there is no such function, the auctioneer adjusts the prices as in the classical model
and the process is repeated.
2.2.2 Asymmetric markets
One can easily adjust the model to allow asymmetric markets. The classical model as-
sumes that buying prices equal selling prices for each good. There are various situations,
in which that is not the case. An example is the existence of transaction costs or delivery
costs. Obviously, the buying price should always be at least as high as the selling price.
Let us assume that the buying price may depend on the selling price and the amount
of goods sold, and denote this relation by a function gj . Thus for selling xj units of
good j at price pj , an agent receives pjxj . For buying xj units of good j at price pj , an
agent has to pay gj(pj , xj)xj . It makes sense to assume that gj(pj , xj) ≥ pj . Note that
for goods with symmetric price structure we have gj(pj , xj) ≡ pj . The market clearing
condition and the optimality condition remain the same. We have to adjust the budget
constraint to
m∑
j=1
gj(pj , xj)(xj − w
j
i )
+ =
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i )
−.
The left-hand side is the amount of money spent on the market, the right hand side is
the amount of money earned, since for xj −w
j
i > 0, agent i is a buyer on the market for
good j and for xj − w
j
i < 0, agent i is a seller on the market for good j. Note that for
gj(pj , xj) ≡ pj (j = 1, . . . ,m), the equation is the same as the old budget constraint:
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i )
+ =
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i )
− ⇐⇒
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i ) = 0.
2.2.3 Payment obligations, income, storage and lending
Agents on the market might have income from and payment obligations to either other
agents which participate in the Walras auction or external counterparties. We aggregate
all those cashflows in the (possibly negative) net income and denote it by ci ∈ R for
agent i. This value can be added to the endowment vector as an (m + 1)-th element.
The budget constraint of agent i for given (p1, . . . , pm) now reads
m∑
j=1
gj(pj , xj)(xj − w
j
i )
+ =
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i )
− + ci.
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But for ci < −
∑m
j=1 pjw
j
i this is not possible: Assume, the budget constraint holds,
then
ci =
m∑
j=1
gj(pj , xj)(xj − w
j
i )
+ −
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i )
− ≥
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i ) ≥ −
m∑
j=1
pjw
j
i .
We want to allow for general net incomes and since there might be agents with spare
liquidity from their cashflows, we introduce lending between agents. Generally, there are
two possible ways to do so:
• Allow every agent to lend to any other agent individually. This means that we get
up to n(n−1)2 different lending markets, possibly with different interest rates.
• Have a centralized lending market, where all lenders and borrowers are perfectly
diversified.
In the current setup, we can handle both options. But since we want to generalize the
set of agents later on, the second option is the more sensible choice. There might be a
positive probability that a borrower cannot pay back such a debt. Therefore we model
the lending market between agents as an asymmetric market. We introduce two variables
referring to the amount lent and borrowed on the market, y+ and y−. Since there might
be tradeable goods or assets outside the auction, we introduce an additional variable z,
which represents the aggregated investments in anything else except the goods 1, . . . ,m
and the interbank market.
A rather strong assumption we have to make at this point is that the redemption
rate on the lending market is known to the auctioneer when making the assignments.
This means that agents state their optimal order sets depending on an assumed overall
redemption rate pˆ and on the interest rate r on the lending market, thus
Oi = Oi(p1, . . . , pm, r, pˆ).
The interpretation of this modification is the following: by stating an optimal order set,
the agent agrees with being assigned an arbitrary x ∈ Oi, given prices (p1, . . . , pm) and
interest rate r, if the redemption rate is pˆ. The interest rate and a possible surcharge
for borrowers enter the reward functions. An element of the optimal order set now is an
(m+ 2)-tuple (x1, . . . , xm, y+, y−), the budget constraint of agent i becomes
m∑
j=1
gj(pj , xj)(xj − w
j
i )
+ + y+ + z =
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − w
j
i )
− + ci + y−.
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The reward functions are modified to include y+ and y−. For example, the typical
reward function from Section 2.2.1 becomes f i(x1, . . . , xm, y+, y−) = U
i(
∑m
j=1 pjxj +
(1+ r)pˆy+− (1+ r)y−). We now assume that f
i is increasing in the first m+1 elements
and decreasing in the (m+ 2)-th element. An optimal market clearing assignment now
also has two more entries am+1 and am+2. The old market clearing conditions still have
to hold, additionally we require
n∑
i=1
am+1(i) =
n∑
i=1
am+2(i),
which simply means that the market for interagent loans clears. We do not restrict
external investments (except for obviously only allowing positive investments) and they
have no influence on the auction, thus there is no need for another entry to the assignment
vector.
An additional step is required since the auctioneer has to check for consistency: if
(p1, . . . , pm, r, pˆ) is a market-clearing price-(m+ 1)-tuple, the auctioneer can only make
the corresponding assignments, if pˆ is actually the real redemption rate in this market.
This requires knowledge of the borrowers’ situation when the credits are due. Assume
that there is a function V , s.t. the wealth of agent i at maturity of the loans, before
clearing, is given by
V (a1(i), . . . , am(i), p1, . . . , pm, vi),
where vi ∈ R is the net income of agent i at maturity. We write shortly V (i, vi) :=
V (a1(i), . . . , am(i), p1, . . . , pm, vi).
The individual redemption rate of agent i, Ri,vi = Ri,vi(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a) is defined
by
Ri,vi :=


am+2(i)(1 + r), V (i, vi)+am+1(i)(1+r)pˆ ≥ am+2(i)(1+r), am+2(i)>0,
(V (i, vi)+am+1(i)pˆ)
+, V (i, vi)+am+1(i)(1+r)pˆ < am+2(i)(1+r), am+2(i)>0,
0, am+2(i) = 0.
The first case is clear: if solvent (i.e. wealth exceeds debts), the agent pays back all his
debts. Otherwise, he pays back as much as he can, i.e. the positive part of his current
wealth. Obviously
Ri,vi(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a, vi) ≤ a3(s)(1 + r).
Since there is full diversification in the lending market, every lender gets paid back the
same fraction of its investment i.e. p˜ · am+1(i) with p˜ ∈ [0, 1]. At maturity, the market
15
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in has to clear the same way as in the auction, that means aggregated redemption paid
by borrowers equals aggregated redemption received by lenders:
n∑
i=1
Ri,vi(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a, vi) =
n∑
i=1
p˜am+1(i) = p˜
n∑
i=1
am+2(i).
This yields the following definition:
Definition 2.3. For given price parameters (p1, . . . , pm), interest rate r and (assumed)
redemption rate pˆ, let a be an optimal market clearing assignment. The real redemption
rate on the lending market is defined by p˜ := 1, if am+2 ≡ 0 and
p˜ :=
∑n
i=1R
i,vi(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a, vi)∑n
i=1 am+2(i)
else. If pˆ = p˜, then (p1, . . . , pm, r), a and pˆ are called consistent.
2.2.4 Arbitrary agent set
In this section we assume, that agents are identical in the sense that there is only one
reward function f valid for all agents. This means that two agents with the same
endowment have the same optimal order set. Furthermore, we assume that the optimal
assignments for two agents with the same optimal order sets coincide, i.e. for i1, i2 ∈
{1, . . . , n}
Oi1 = Oi2 =⇒ a(i1) = a(i2).
These assumptions are necessary for the following reformulation of the problem. Let
I = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents in the market and let S be a state space. Agent
i’s state is denoted by si. We assume that an agent’s endowment (and therefore his
demand) as well as his net income are determined by such a state, consequently there is
a function h : S → Rm≥0 × R and agent i has the endowment h(si), i.e. w
j
i = hj(si) and
ci = hm+1(si).
The optimal order sets only depend on the state, thus we write Osi instead of Oi. Here
we have S = {z1, . . . , zl} with l ≤ n (the number of states is n, if every agent faces
a different state). We denote by δk the number of agents, who face situation zk, i.e.
δk = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : si = zk}|. Obviously,
∑l
k=1 δk = n has to hold. Since the optimal
assignment now only depends on the optimal order set, which in turn only depends on
the state an agent faces, we can think of it as a function with domain S instead of I.
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The market clearing conditions can be rewritten:
n∑
i=1
aj(si) =
n∑
i=1
hj(si) ⇐⇒
l∑
k=1
δkaj(zk) =
l∑
k=1
δkhj(zk),
for j = 1, . . . ,m and
n∑
i=1
am+1(i) =
n∑
i=1
am+2(i)⇐⇒
l∑
k=1
δkam+1(zk) =
l∑
k=1
δkam+2(zk).
Now consider a probability space (Ω,A,P) and the random variable Y : Ω → S with
distribution P(Y = zk) =
δk
n
(k = 1, . . . , l). Then the market clearing conditions can
again be rewritten as
E(aj(Y )) = E(hj(Y )), j = 1, . . . ,m,
E(am+1(Y )) = E(am+2(Y )).
We can proceed similarly with the net income of agent i at maturity, vi. Define a
random variable X by P(X = vi) =
|{j∈{1,...,n}:vj=vi}|
n
. With the setup of this section,
the individual redemption rate depends on the state of an agent and the net income at
maturity. Thus the definition of the real redemption rate becomes
p˜ :=
E(RY,X(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a))
Eam+2(Y )
.
With this interpretation we can now allow for arbitrary agents sets I, state sets S and
state distributions, represented by a random variable Y as well as income distributions,
represented by a random variable X. The only necessary assumption is the existence of
E(h(Y )).
17
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2.3 The generalized Walras equilibrium with lending
Now let us sum up all the changes and list the necessary steps for determining equilibrium
prices and assignments. A generalized Walras equilibrium with lending for m tradeable
goods is derived as follows: Let I and S be arbitrary sets, Z ∈ {{0},R≥0}, h : S →
R
m
≥0 ×R and v : R
2m
≥0 ×R→ R functions and f : R
m+3
≥0 → R a function, which is strictly
decreasing in the (m+ 2)-th element and strictly increasing in every other element. For
j = 1, . . . ,m let gj : R
2
>0 → R>0 be a function with gj(p, x) ≥ p, for all (p, x) ∈ R
2
>0. Let
(Ω,A,P) be a probability space. Let Y : Ω → S and X : Ω → R be random variables,
with E(|hj(Y )|) <∞ for all j = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 2.4. Let (p1, . . . , pm), r and pˆ be fixed. The optimal order set of an
agent facing state s ∈ S is the set Os = Os(p1, . . . , pm, r, pˆ) ⊂ R
m+2
≥0 , s.t. every x =
(x1, . . . , xm, y+, y−) ∈ O
s satisfies:
• budget constraint:
z :=
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − hj(s))
− −
m∑
j=1
gj(pj , xj)(xj − hj(s))
+ + hm+1(s) + y− − y+ ∈ Z,
• optimality:
f(x, z) = max
(y1,...,ym+3)∈R
m+3
≥0
f(y1, . . . , ym+3).
Note that the choice of Z decides whether external investments are allowed (Z = R≥0)
or not (Z = {0}). z is the optimal amount invested outside the Walras auction.
Definition 2.5. Let (p1, . . . , pm), r and pˆ be fixed. An optimal market-clearing
assignment is a function
a : S → Rm+2≥0 , s 7→ (a1(s), . . . , am+2(s)),
such that for every s ∈ S
a(s) ∈ Os
and the market clearing conditions hold:
E(aj(Y )) = E(hj(Y )), j = 1, . . . ,m,
E(am+1(Y )) = E(am+2(Y )).
18
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If such a function exists, we call (p1, . . . , pm, r) an equilibrium price (m + 1)-tuple.
We call (p1, . . . , pm, r), a and pˆ consistent, iff
pˆ =
E(RY,X(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a))
Eam+2(Y )
,
where for s ∈ S and x ∈ R, Rs,x = Rs,x(pˆ, r, p1, . . . , pm, a) is defined by
Rs,x :=


am+2(s)(1 + r), V (s, x) + am+1(s)pˆ ≥ am+2(s)(1 + r), am+2(s) > 0,
(V (s, x) + am+1(s)pˆ)
+, V (s, x) + am+1(s)pˆ < am+2(s)(1 + r), am+2(s) > 0,
0, am+2(s) = 0,
with V (s, x) := v(a1(s), . . . , am(s), p1, . . . , pm, x).
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3 The Interbank Market
3.1 The model
In this section we will specify the mathematical setup for our model and give an overview
over the three-period market.
We assume WLOG that there is no discounting between the three dates t = 0, t1, t2
and that the set of banks is given by [0, 1].
Utility is measured by a strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous function
u.
We normalize the problem by assuming that each bank has one unit of the households’
funds under management at t = 0. Thus all other values are to be considered relative
to the actual value of funds managed by each bank. Any fraction of those claims can be
withdrawn either at t = t1 or t = t2 and the resulting payout is calculated as withdrawal
times a factor c1 or c2 respectively.
The demand for liquidity on individual bank level is determined by a [0, 1]-valued
non-constant random variable Λ with known distribution. Λ describes the fraction of
claims, which are withdrawn in t = t1, thus a bank pays out Λc1 in t = t1 and (1−Λ)c2
in t = t2.
The value of the risky investment is modeled by a constant S0 and a random variable
St2 , where St2 is the t2-value of the risky asset and for all banks the distribution of said
value is the same.
The bond prices are denoted by P0 in t = 0 and P2 in t = t2. The liquid asset obviously
has a constant price of 1.
Since all banks are identical and face the same situation in t0, we can assume WLOG,
that their investment decisions in t0 coincide. We denote the allocation by (α, β0, δ0),
which represents the fraction of funds invested in the risky investment, bonds and the
liquid asset, where α, β0, δ0 ≥ 0 and α + β0 + δ0 = 1. Note that α, β0 and δ0 are the
21
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t0-value of the assets held, which is equivalent to holding
α
S0
, β0
P0
and δ0 units.
Assuming that we find equilibrium prices P1 (bond price) and r (unsecured interest
rate) and a consistent redemption rate pˆ, the assets and financial claims (measured in
monetary value) are given by:
t 0 t1 t2
cash −δ0 δ0
−δ1 δ1
stock −α 0 α
St2
S0
bond −β0 β0
P1
P0
−β1 β1
P2
P1
unsecured ib debt −γ+ γ+pˆ(1 + r)
γ− −γ−(1 + r)
cash flow 1 −Λc1 −(1− Λ)c2
The budget constraints in t = 0 and t = t1 are included in this table. In order to retrieve
them, we take the sum over all entries in the corresponding column.
The terminal wealth can be calculated by taking the sum over all entries in the last
column.
22
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3.2 The existence of an interbank market and equilibrium
prices
In this chapter we will study the banks’ behaviour in t1 given an arbitrary investment
decision from t0. Banks have to satisfy households’ liquidity needs. The illiquid asset
cannot be traded, bonds will be traded in a generalized Walras auction with lending.
Spare liquidity can be put into the liquid asset.
As we assume that bonds can be traded, there is one good that will be auctioned, thus
m = 1. The agent set for the Walras auction is I = [0, 1], since every bank is an agent.
We choose the space of all possible payouts a bank has to make to the households as the
state space, i.e. S = supp(Λc1) ⊂ [0, c1]. The state distribution is given by Y ≡ Λc1.
We assume that there are no transaction costs on any trade of bonds, thus g1(p, x) ≡ p.
There is an external investment possibility, namely the liquid asset. Thus Z = R≥0.
What remains is deriving the endowment function h and the reward function f .
The initial endowment of bonds is the same for all banks:
h1 ≡
β0
P0
.
The net income is the difference between what was stored in the liquid asset and the
payout to households:
h2(s) = δ0 − s, s ∈ S.
The goal is to maximize expected utility of terminal wealth (i.e. wealth in t2). If there
is an optimal assignment a with a corresponding investment in the liquid asset δ1, then
a bank facing state s will have a terminal wealth of
V s2 (α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ a1(s)P2 + a2(s)(1 + r)pˆ− a3(s)(1 + r) + δ1(s)− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
Thus a possible function v, as introduced in section 2.3, is
v(a1(s), . . . , a3(s), P1, x) := α
x
S0
+ a1(s)P2 + δ1(s)− (1−
s
c1
)c2
and the distribution of the net income is X
d
= St2 .
Before checking for optimal assignments, we have to determine optimal order sets by
looking for maxima. For the optimization problem at hand, the reward function of an
agent facing state s for given p1, r and pˆ should be
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E
[
U(α
St2
S0
+ x1P2 + y+(1 + r)pˆ− y−(1 + r) + z − (1−
s
c1
)c2)
]
.
But we can simplify this function in this chapter, since a bank can only influence x1,
y+, y− and z. The only random part is
St2
S0
and since expectation is strictly increasing,
it can be left out of the maximization problem at hand. u is also assumed to be strictly
increasing, therefore neither changes the result and can be left out. Finally, (1 − s
c1
)c2
is a constant and thus also ignored. Summing up, maximizing the above term in t1 is
equivalent to maximizing
f(x1, y+, y−, z) := x1P2 + y+(1 + r)pˆ− y−(1 + r) + z.
The definiton of z in the budget constraint z ∈ Z = R≥0 can be written more simple
as in the definition, since we have a symmetric market:
z =
m∑
j=1
pj(xj − hj(s))
− −
m∑
j=1
gj(pj , xj)(xj − hj(s))
+ + hm+1(s) + y− − y+
⇔ z = p1(
β0
P0
− x1) + δ0 − s+ y− − y+.
We replace the notation from chapter 2 by the notation in chapter 3.1. Thus we will
write P1 instead of p1, β1 instead of x1, δ1 instead of z (the liquid asset is the only
external investment possibility) and γ+/γ− instead of y+/y− respectively. We define for
every s ∈ S the constraint set Cs by
Cs := {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ R
3
≥0 : β1P1 + γ+ − γ− ≤ β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s}.
This is the set of all (β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ R
3
≥0, which satisfy δ1 ∈ R≥0, i.e the budget constraint
in the definition of the optimal order set.
Thus we have X = St2 and for x ∈ supp(St2) and s ∈ supp(Y ), the individual
redemption rate is given by
Rs,x(pˆ, r, P1, a) :=


a3(s)(1 + r), V
s,x
2 (α, β0, δ0) ≥ 0, a3(s) > 0,
(V s,x2 (α, β0, δ0) + a3(s)(1 + r))
+, V
s,x
2 (α, β0, δ0) < 0, a3(s) > 0,
0, a3(s) = 0.
Recall that the real redemption rate on the unsecured interbank market is given by
p˜ := 1, if a3 ≡ 0 and
p˜ :=
E
[
RY,St2 (pˆ, r, P1, a)
]
E [a3(Y )(1 + r)]
=
E
[
RY,St2 (pˆ, r, P1, a)1{a3(Y )>0}
]
E
[
a3(Y )(1 + r)1{a3(Y )>0}
]
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else.
Now we can determine the optimal order sets. The reward function f is affine and the
constraint set Cs is a convex polytope. Therefore, Os either is empty, contains only one
element or is uncountable for a given (P1, r, pˆ).
Write o = (β1, γ+, γ−) for an element of the order set. For pˆ = 0, define
1
pˆ
− 1 := +∞.
Theorem 3.1. For every s ∈ S, the order sets Os = Os(P1, r, pˆ) are uniquely determined
by
Os=


∅,
pˆ ∈ [0, 1], r ∈ (−1, 0), P1 ∈ (0,∞) or
pˆ ∈ [0, 1], r ∈ [0,∞), P1 ∈ (0,
P2
1+r ),
{o∈Cs : β1=γ+=0}, pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r = 0, P1 ∈ (P2,∞),
{(0, 0, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−)}, pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ (0, 1
pˆ
− 1), P1 ∈ (P2,∞),{
o ∈ Cs :
γ+ ≤ (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
+,
β1=0, γ−=(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−
}
, pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r = 1
pˆ
− 1, P1 ∈ (P2,∞),
{o∈Cs : γ+=0}, pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r = 0, P1 = P2,
{o∈Cs :γ+=0, β1P1−γ−=
P1β0
P0
+δ0−s}, pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ (0,∞), P1 =
P2
1+r ,
{( δ0
P1
+ β0
P0
− s
P1
, 0, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−)},
pˆ∈(0, 1), r∈(0, 1
pˆ
−1], P1∈(
P2
1+r , P2)
or pˆ=0, r∈(0,∞), P1∈(
P2
1+r , P2) or
pˆ∈(0,1), r> 1
pˆ
−1, P1∈(
P2
1+r ,
P2
(1+r)pˆ),{
o∈Cs :
β1P1≤(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
+,
γ+=0, γ−=(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−
}
, pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ (0, 1
pˆ
− 1), P1 = P2,{
o∈Cs :
β1P1 + γ+≤(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
+,
γ−=(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−
}
, pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r = 1
pˆ
− 1, P1 = P2,{
o∈Cs :
β1P1 + γ+=(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
+,
γ−=(β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−
}
, pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (1
pˆ
−1,∞), P1 =
P2
(1+r)pˆ ,
{(0, (β0
P1
P0
+δ0−s)
+, (β0
P1
P0
+δ0−s)
−)}, pˆ∈(0,1), r∈(1
pˆ
−1,∞), P1∈(
P2
(1+r)pˆ ,∞),
{o∈Cs : β1 = 0}, pˆ = 1, r = 0, P1 ∈ (P2,∞),
{o∈Cs : β1=0, γ+−γ−=
P1
P0
β0+δ0−s}, pˆ = 1, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 ∈ (
P2
(1+r) ,∞),
{o∈Cs : β1P1+γ+−γ−=
P1
P0
β0+δ0−s}, pˆ = 1, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 =
P2
(1+r) ,
Cs, pˆ = 1, r = 0, P1 = P2.
With knowledge of the order sets, we can determine optimal assignments and equilib-
rium prices. Recall that an optimal assignment is a function a : S → R3≥0 with a(s) ∈ O
s
for all s ∈ S and
E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
, E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )].
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Write A for the set of all functions from S to R3≥0, which (as an assignment) satisfy the
market clearing conditions i.e.
A := {a ∈
(
R
3
≥0
)S
: E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
, E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )]}.
For given (α, β0, δ0), we write all possible equilibrium prices and corresponding optimal
market clearing assignments as a subset of
B := [0, 1]× (−1,∞)× (0,∞)×A.
Write b = (pˆ, r, P1, a) for an element of B and define
Y := ess sup Y = inf
N⊂[0,1],P (N)=0
sup
i∈[0,1]\N
Y (i).
Theorem 3.2. For an initial allocation (α, β0, δ0), the set of all possible equilibrium
prices and corresponding optimal market clearing assignments is given by
∅, δ0 < E(Y ),
{b∈B : pˆ∈(0, 1), r∈ [1
pˆ
−1,∞), P1∈ [
P2
(1+r)pˆ ,∞), a∈A1}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r∈ [0,∞), P1∈ [
P2
1+r ,∞), a∈A2}
, δ0 = EY, β0 = 0,
{b∈B : pˆ∈(0, 1), r= 1
pˆ
−1, P1∈ [P2,∞), a∈A3}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r=0, P1∈ [P2,∞), a∈A4}
, δ0∈(EY, Y ), β0=0,
{b∈B : pˆ∈ [0, 1), r∈ [0, 1
pˆ
−1], P1∈ [P2,∞), a ≡ 0}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r=0, P1∈ [P2,∞), a∈A4}
, δ0∈ [Y , 1], β0=0,
{b∈B : pˆ∈(0, 1), r∈ [1
pˆ
−1,∞), P1=
P2
(1+r)pˆ , a∈A5}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r∈ [0,∞), P1=
P2
1+r , a∈A6}
,
δ0=EY, β0>0
β0<
P0
P2
(Y −EY ),
{b∈B : pˆ∈(0, 1), r∈ [1
pˆ
−1,∞), P1=
P2
(1+r)pˆ , a∈A5}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r∈ [0,∞), P1=
P2
1+r , a∈A6}
⋃
{b∈B : pˆ∈ [0, 1), P1∈ [P0
Y−EY
β0
, P2], r∈ [
P2
P1
−1, P2
P1pˆ
−1), a∈A7}
,
δ0=EY, β0≤1−EY,
β0≥
P0
P2
(Y −EY ),
{b∈B : pˆ∈(0, 1), r= 1
pˆ
−1, P1=P2, a∈A8}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r=0, P1=P2, a∈A9}
,
δ0∈(EY, Y ), β0>0
β0<
P0
P2
(Y −δ0),
{b∈B : pˆ∈(0, 1), r= 1
pˆ
−1, P1=P2, a∈A8}⋃
{b∈B : pˆ=1, r=0, P1=P2, a∈A9}
{b∈B : pˆ∈ [0, 1), r∈ [0, 1
pˆ
−1), P1=P2, a∈A10}
,
δ0∈(EY, 1), β0≤1−δ0,
β0≥
P0
P2
(Y −δ0).
The sets of corresponding optimal market clearing assignments above are defined as
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follows:
A1:={a ∈ A : a(s) = (0, (EY − s)
+, (EY − s)−) ∀s ∈ S}
A2:={a ∈ A : a1(s) = 0, a2(s)− a3(s) = EY − s ∀s ∈ S}
A3:={a ∈ A : a1(s)=0, a2(s)≤(δ0 − s)
+, a3(s)=(δ0 − s)
− ∀s ∈ S}
A4:={a ∈ A : a1(s) = 0, a2(s)− a3(s) ≤ δ0 − s ∀s ∈ S}
A5:={a ∈ A : a1(s)P1+a2(s)=(EY +β0
P1
P0
−s)+, a3(s)=(EY +β0
P1
P0
−s)− ∀s ∈ S}
A6:={a ∈ A : a1(s)P1+a2(s)−a3(s)=EY +β0
P1
P0
−s ∀s ∈ S}
A7:={a ∈ A : a(s) = (
EY
P1
+ β0
P0
− s
P1
, 0, 0) ∀s ∈ S}
A8:={a ∈ A : a1(s)P2+a2(s)≤(δ0+β0
P2
P0
−s)+, a3(s)=(δ0+β0
P2
P0
−s)− ∀s ∈ S}
A9:={a ∈ A : a1(s)P2+a2(s)−a3(s)≤δ0+β0
P2
P0
−s ∀s ∈ S}
A10:={a ∈ A : a2(s) = a3(s) = 0, a1(s)P2 ≤ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
− s ∀s ∈ S}
The last step is to check the parameter pˆ for consistency in the sense of definition 2.5.
Theorem 3.2 implies, that there is no consistent quadruple for δ0 < EY . Thus, assume
δ0 ≥ EY .
We have a fix point problem. There might be multiple redemption rates that allow
for consistent equilibrium prices and assignments. In this chapter, we will characterize
the existence of a consistent quadruple (pˆ, r, P1, a).
But first we discuss a trivial case, δ0 + β0
P2
P0
≥ Y . In this case, there is no need for
interbank lending. All banks can pay out the households’ claims by liquidating bonds
and using the liquid asset. Thus (pˆ, r, P1, a) = (1, 0, P2, a) is consistent for all a ∈ A
with a2 ≡ a3 ≡ 0.
For the rest of this chapter we consider the non-trivial case δ0 + β0
P2
P0
< Y . If we find
a consistent quadruple, then there is definitely unsecured interbank lending, since banks
with s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
need to borrow in order to pay out the households’ claims.
Define S :=
ess inf St2
S0
and S :=
ess sup St2
S0
. Set A := {Y > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
} =
Y −1
((
δ0 + β0
P2
P0
, c1
])
⊂ [0, 1] and define
Y := ess inf
A
Y = sup
N⊂A,P (N)=0
inf
i∈A\N
Y (i).
Note that Y ≥ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
.
Furthermore, define h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] by
h(0) := 0, h(p) := p
E
[
RY,St2 (p, 1
p
− 1, P2, a)
]
E
[
(δ0 + β0
P2
P0
− Y )−
] , p ∈ (0, 1],
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with a3(s) = (δ0 + β0
P2
P0
− s)− and (a1(s) + a2(s))a3(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. Thus, by the
definiton of Rs,x, h is well-defined.
Lemma 3.3. Set p0 := 0 and pn := h(pn−1),n ∈ N. Then p := limn→∞ pn ∈ [0, 1] exists
and depends only on (α, β0, δ0). p is the largest fixpoint of h.
We consider the model parameters as constant. Obviously, p depends on P2 and the
distributions of St2 and Y . The lemma states, that p is independent of the choice of a
particular assignment or equilibrium prices where there is ambiguity. This is important
in the next theorem, since the existence of a consistent quadruple depends only on the
value of p.
Theorem 3.4. There is a consistent quadruple (pˆ, r, P1, a), iff p > 0 and for p > 0
there is an assignment a ∈ A, s.t. (p, 1
p
− 1, P2, a) is consistent. A consistent quadruple
(pˆ, r, P1, a) with pˆ = 1 exists, iff p = 1, which is equivalent to
αS + β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 + Y (
c2
c1
− 1)+ − Y (
c2
c1
− 1)− ≥ c2.
The value of p also tells us whether a redemption rate of 1 is possible, which is,
economically speaking, the optimal case. There might be other criteria to choose a
consistent quadruple than maximizing the redemption rate. We will discuss some of
those in a more specific setup in the next chapter.
Finally, we will show that we can get unique optimal assignments for given (pˆ, r, P1)
by making only the following two assumptions:
Assumption 3.5. The auctioneer assigns bonds and unsecured interbank loans according
to the following rules:
• suppliers in the bond market may sell their minimal supply only
• demanders in both markets get assigned a constant fraction of their maximal de-
mand
Minimal supply and maximal demand are taken over all possible optimal assignments,
given by theorem 3.2.
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Theorem 3.6. For equilibirum prices (pˆ, r, P1), assuming 3.5, the optimal assignment
is unique and given by
a1(s) =


0 , s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s , δ0 ≤ s ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
β0
P1
P0
+ AS
B
AD
(δ0 − s) , s < δ0
a2(s) =

 0 , s ≥ δ0ASU
AD
(δ0 − s) , s < δ0
a3(s) =

 s− δ0 − β0
P1
P0
, s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
0 , s ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
δ1(s) =

 0 , s ≥ δ0(1− ASB+ASU
AD
)(δ0 − s) , s < δ0
where
ASU = E[(Y − δ0 − β0
P1
P0
)1
{Y >δ0+β0
P1
P0
}
],
ASB = β0
P1
P0
P (Y > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
) + E[(Y − δ0)1{δ0<Y≤δ0+β0 P1P0 }
].
and
ADU = E[(δ0 − Y )1{Y <δ0}].
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4 Optimal interest rates and initial
allocation
As we have seen in the previous section, the auctioneer can choose between different
interest rates, iff δ0 = EY . This choice has an impact on the expected utility of terminal
wealth, in contrast to the choice of an optimal assignment. Therefore we will determine
the interest rate, which maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth, given an initial
allocation (α, β0, δ0).
Depending on the distribution of Λ, supP1∈(0,P2] V2(P1) might not be attained. Thus
we will choose an interest rate P ∗1 ∈ argmaxV2(P1), if possible and P
∗
1 = P2 else (P1 = P2
is a possible equlibrium price in every case and is also the unique equilibirum price for
any initial allocation with δ0 > EY ). Note that P
∗
1 depends on the initial allocation:
P ∗1 = P
∗
1 (α, β0, δ0).
The banks are aware of the choice of P1 a priori, i.e. they know which interest rate
will result depending on their initial allocation. Thus we can look for an optimal initial
allocation considering the choice of interest rate described above.
We will calculate some examples in this chapter, but first we will derive a general
result, namely the optimal amount invested in the liquid asset.
Assume that there is an optimal allocation (α, β0, δ0) with δ0 > EY . Set (α˜, β˜0, δ˜0) :=
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(α, β0 + δ0 − EY,EY ). Then the bond price in t = t1 is given by P2 > P0 and we have
V2(α, β0, δ0, P2)
=
(
α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − Λc1 − (1− Λ)c2
)
· 1
{Λ≤ 1
c1
(δ0+β0
P2
P0
)}
+
(
α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0pˆ
+ (δ0 − Λc1)
1
pˆ
− (1− Λ)c2
)
· 1
{Λ> 1
c1
(δ0+β0
P2
P0
)}
<
(
α
St2
S0
+ β˜0
P2
P0
+ EY − Λc1 − (1− Λ)c2
)
· 1
{Λ≤ 1
c1
(δ0+β0
P2
P0
)}
+
(
α
St2
S0
+ β˜0
P2
P0pˆ
+ (EY − Λc1)
1
pˆ
− (1− Λ)c2
)
· 1
{Λ> 1
c1
(δ0+β0
P2
P0
)}
= V2(α˜, β˜0, δ˜0, P2)
Expected utility is strictly increasing, thus we have
E(U(V2(α, β0, δ0, P2))) < E(U(V2(α˜, β˜0, δ˜0, P2))) ≤ E(U(V2(α˜, β˜0, δ˜0, P
∗
1 ))).
by definition of P ∗1 . This is a contradiction to (α, β0, δ0) being optimal.
Using δ0 = EY , the equality constraint on the initial allocation is equivalent to α =
1− EY − β0. The inequality constraints on α and β0 become
0 ≤ β0 ≤ 1− EY.
The constraint on δ0 is obviously fulfilled, since EY > 0. We can rewrite the terminal
wealth as a function in one variable:
V2(β0) := V2(1− EY − β0, β0, EY, P
∗
1 (1− EY − β0, β0, EY )).
The optimization problem becomes
max
β0∈[0,1−EY ]
V2(β0).
Where convenient, we will consider V2 as a function in α and β0 or only in α.
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4.1 Example: Binomial distributions for risky asset and
liquidity demand
Let 0 ≤ d < u, p ∈ (0, 1) and assume
P (
St2
S0
= u) = p = 1− P (
St2
S0
= d).
Furthermore, let 0 < λl < λh < 1, πh ∈ (0, 1) assume
P (Λ = λh) = πh = 1− P (Λ = λl).
Set πl := 1− πh. Recall that Y = c1Λ. Thus EY = c1(πhλh + πlλl), Y = c1λh.
Let the utility function of banks be given by U : R → R, U(x) := − 1
κ
exp(−κx) for
some κ > 0.
First, we determine optimal bond prices.
(i) δ0 = c1(πhλh + πlλl), β0 ≥
P0
P2
c1πl(λh − λl)
In this case, there is no need for unsecured lending, if P1 ∈
[
P0
c1πl(λh−λl)
β0
, P2
]
6= ∅.
Substitute x = 1
P1
. Expected utility of terminal wealth is given by
E(U(V2(x))) = πlpU
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c1P2x− (1− λl)c2
)
+πl(1− p)U
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c1P2x− (1− λl)c2
)
+πhpU
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
− πl(λh − λl)c1P2x− (1− λh)c2
)
+πh(1− p)U
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
− πl(λh − λl)c1P2x− (1− λh)c2
)
Taking the derivative with respect to x and evaluating at x = c2
P2c1
, we get
∂E(U(V2(x)))
∂x
|x= c2
P2c1
= πlπh(λh − λl)c1P2pU
′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λl)c2
)
+πlπh(λh − λl)c1P2(1− p)U
′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λl)c2
)
−πhπl(λh − λl)c1P2pU
′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
− πl(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λh)c2
)
−πhπl(λh − λl)c1P2(1− p)U
′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
− πl(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λh)c2
)
= 0,
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since
πh(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λl)c2 = (πhλh + πlλl − 1)c2 = −πl(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λh)c2.
The second derivative with respect to x is strictly negative:
∂2E(U(V2(x)))
∂2x
= πl(πh(λh − λl)c1P2)
2pU ′′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λl)c2
)
+πl(πh(λh − λl)c1P2)
2(1− p)U ′′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λl)c2
)
+πh(πl(λh − λl)c1P2)
2pU ′′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
− πl(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λh)c2
)
+πh(πl(λh − λl)c1P2)
2(1− p)U ′′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
− πl(λh − λl)c2 − (1− λh)c2
)
< 0,
since U is strictly concave an therefore U ′′ < 0.
Thus x = c2
P2c1
is the unique zero of ∂E(U(V2(x)))
∂x
, E(U(V2(x))) is increasing for
x < c2
P2c1
and decreasing for x > c2
P2c1
. Resubstituting P1 =
1
x
, we get as expected-
utility-maximizing bond price P1 = P2
c1
c2
. This value does not necessarily lie in the
interval
[
P0
c1πl(λh−λl)
β0
, P2
]
, thus we get different optimal interest rates depending
on the values of c1 and c2:
P ∗1 =


P2 , c1 ≥ c2
P2
c1
c2
, c1 < c2 ≤
P2
P0
β0
πl(λh−λl)
P0
c1πl(λh−λl)
β0
, c2 >
P2
P0
β0
πl(λh−λl)
Note that this result holds for all strictly increasing, strictly concave utility func-
tions.
(ii) δ0 = c1(πhλh + πlλl), β0 <
P0
P2
c1πl(λh − λl)
In this situation, banks with s = λhc1 need to borrow on the unsecured interbank
market and banks with s = λlc1 can pay households’ liquidity needs out of the
liquid asset.
By theorem 3.4, a consistent quadruple (pˆ, r, P1, a) with pˆ = 1 exists, iff
αS + β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 + Y (
c2
c1
− 1)+ − Y (
c2
c1
− 1)− ≥ c2.
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Here we have Y = ess inf (Y 1
{Y >δ0+β0
P2
P0
}
) = c1λh and S =
ess inf St2
S0
= d. The
condition becomes
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 + c1λh(
c2
c1
− 1)+ − c1λh(
c2
c1
− 1)− ≥ c2
⇐⇒ αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − λhc1 − (1− λh)c2 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ α
(
P2
P0
− d
)
≤
P2
P0
− δ0
(
P2
P0
− 1
)
− λhc1 − (1− λh)c2.
Since P2
P0
> d, this is possible, iff
P2
P0
− δ0
(
P2
P0
− 1
)
− λhc1 − (1− λh)c2 > 0.
This also means, that for
α
(
P2
P0
− d
)
>
P2
P0
− δ0
(
P2
P0
− 1
)
− λhc1 − (1− λh)c2,
there is no consistent quadruple (pˆ, r, P1, a) with pˆ = 1 and thus only banks with
s = λhc1 are borrowers on the unsecured market. Therefore the redemption rate
can either be p or 0. In the latter case, there is no consistent quadruple. A
redemption rate of p is possible, if
α
(
u−
P2
P0
)
≥ −
P2
P0
+ δ0
(
P2
P0
− 1
)
+ λhc1 + (1− λh)c2.
Expected utility of terminal wealth is given by
E(u(V2(x))) = πlpU
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c1P2x− (1− λl)c2
)
+πl(1− p)U
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c1P2x− (1− λl)c2
)
+πhpU
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0p
− πl(λh − λl)c1
P2
p
x− (1− λh)c2
)
+πh(1− p)U
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0p
− πl(λh − λl)c1
P2
p
x− (1− λh)c2
)
Taking the derivative with respect to x, evaluating at
x =
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(πh +
1
p
πl)(λh − λl)c1P2
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and dividing by the positive constant πlπh(λh − λl)c1P2 exp(κc2), we get
1
πlπh(λh − λl)c1P2 exp(κc2)
∂E(U(V2(x)))
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=
ln(p)−κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1p )−(λh−λl)c2)
κ(pih+
1
ppil)(λh−λl)c1P2
= pU ′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(πh +
1
p
πl)
+ λlc2
)
+(1−p)U ′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(πh +
1
p
πl)
+ λlc2
)
−U ′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0p
− πl
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(pπh + πl)
+ λhc2
)
−
1−p
p
U ′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0p
− πl
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(pπh + πl)
+ λhc2
)
= 0,
since
pU ′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(πh +
1
p
πl)
+ λlc2
)
=
pU ′
(
ln(p)
πh
κ(πh+
1
p
πl)
+ αu+ β0
P2
P0
(
1−
πh(1−
1
p
)
πh+
1
p
πl
)
+ c2
(
πh(λh−λl)
πh+
1
p
πl
+ λl
))
= p
pil
ppih+pil exp
(
−κ
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0
1)
pπh + πl
+ c2
πhλh +
1
p
πlλl)
πh +
1
p
πl
))
=
U ′
(
− ln(p)
πl
κ(pπh + πl)
+αu+β0
P2
P0
1
p
(
1+
πl(1−
1
p
)
πh +
1
p
πl
)
+c2
(
−πl(λh − λl)
pπh + πl
+λh
))
= U ′
(
αu+ β0
P2
P0p
− πl
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(pπh + πl)
+ λhc2
)
and analoguosly
(1−p)U ′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0
+ πh
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(πh +
1
p
πl)
+ λlc2
)
=
1−p
p
U ′
(
αd+ β0
P2
P0p
− πl
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
κ(pπh + πl)
+ λhc2
)
.
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Again, the second derivative with respect to x is strictly negative:
∂2E(U(V2(x)))
∂2x
= πl(πh(λh − λl)c1P2)
2pU ′′
(
V
u,l
2 (P1)
)
+πl(πh(λh − λl)c1P2)
2(1− p)U ′′
(
V
d,l
2 (P1)
)
+πh(πl(λh − λl)c1P2)
2 1
p
U ′′
(
V
u,h
2 (P1)
)
+πh(πl(λh − λl)c1P2)
2 1− p
p2
U ′′
(
V
d,h
2 (P1)
)
< 0,
since U is strictly concave an therefore U ′′ < 0.
Thus the optimal bond price in this case is
P1 =
κ(πh +
1
p
πl)(λh − λl)c1P2
ln(p)− κ(β0
P2
P0
(1− 1
p
)− (λh − λl)c2)
.
Next, we look for an optimal initial allocation. Using δ0 = EY = c1(πhλh+ πlλl) and
α+ β0 + δ0 = 1, we can write the portfolio value as a function of only one variable, for
example for λ = λl and
St2
S0
= u:
V
λl,u
2 (α) = αu+ (1− α− c1(πhλh + πlλl))
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c1
P2
P1
− (1− λl)c2
= α(u−
P2
P0
) + (1− c1(πhλh + πlλl))
P2
P0
+ πh(λh − λl)c1
P2
P1
− (1− λl)c2.
The first derivative of the expectation of terminal wealth with respect to α is
∂E(U(V2(α)))
∂α
= πlp(u−
P2
P0
) exp
(
−κ
(
V
λl,u
2 (α)
))
+πl(1− p)(d−
P2
P0
) exp
(
−κ
(
V
λl,d
2 (α)
))
+πhp(u−
P2
P0
) exp
(
−κ
(
V
λh,u
2 (α)
))
+πh(1− p)(d−
P2
P0
) exp
(
−κ
(
V
λh,d
2 (α)
))
Thus ∂E(U(V2(α)))
∂α
= 0, iff
p(u−
P2
P0
)
(
πl exp
(
−κ
(
V
λl,u
2 (α)
))
+ πh exp
(
−κ
(
V
λh,u
2 (α)
)))
=
(1− p)(
P2
P0
− d)
(
πl exp
(
−κ
(
V
λl,d
2 (α)
))
+ πh exp
(
−κ
(
V
λh,d
2 (α)
)))
.
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This equation can be solved to
exp (−κα(u− d)) =
1− p
p
P2
P0
− d
u− P2
P0
⇐⇒ α =
1
−κ(u− d)
ln
(
1− p
p
P2
P0
− d
u− P2
P0
)
.
Since pu+ (1− p)d > P2
P0
, we have 1−p
p
P2
P0
−d
u−
P2
P0
< 1, thus the right-hand side is positive.
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Proof of 3.1. We will prove Theorem 3.1 by stating the KKT conditions for our opti-
mization problem and then deriving the set of optimal solutions for every case. In order
to get the standard KKT representation, we rewrite the constraints with δ1 as a slack
variable.
The Karush Kuhn Tucker conditions
For a fixed state s ∈ S and fixed (P1, r, pˆ) we get as necessary conditions for the
optimization problem max f(β1, γ+, γ−, δ1) with f(β1, γ+, γ−, δ1) := β1P2+γ+(1+ r)pˆ−
γ−(1 + r) + δ1.
(1) primal feasibility
g(β1, γ+, γ−, δ1) ≥ 0 with g : R
4 → R4,
g(β1, γ+, γ−, δ1) = (β1, γ+, γ−, δ1)
h(β1, γ+, γ−, δ1) = 0 with h : R
4 → R,
h(β1, γ+, γ−, δ1) = β1P1 + γ+ − γ− + δ1 − β0
P1
P0
− δ0 + s
(2) dual feasibility
Let µi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 be the KKT multipliers on β1 ≥ 0, γ+ ≥ 0, γ− ≥ 0 and δ1 ≥ 0
and ν the multiplier on the budget constraint. Then
µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 ≥ 0
(3) complementary slackness
β1µ1 = γ+µ2 = γ−µ3 = δ1µ4 = 0
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(4) stationarity: ∇f +
∑4
i=1 µi∇g + ν∇h = 0
P2 + µ1 + νP1 = 0
(1 + r)pˆ+ µ2 + ν = 0
−(1 + r) + µ3 − ν = 0
1 + µ4 + ν = 0
We can rewrite the first condition as P2
P1
+ 1
P1
µ1 + ν = 0, since P1 ∈ (0,∞). Dual
feasibility and complementary slackness hold for µ1 iff they hold for µ˜1 :=
1
P1
µ1, i.e.
the first stationarity condition can be replaced by
P2
P1
+ µ1 + ν = 0
Regularity
Since f and g are affine functions, a maximum point must satisfy the above conditions.
Sufficiency
Since f and gj (j = 1, . . . , 4) are continuously differentiable and concave and h is
affine, those conditions are also sufficient for optimality.
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For every element of the optimal order set, there is a unique δ1, which represents the
amount invested in the liquid asset. Since it can be calculated via
δ1 =
P1
P0
β0 − β1P1 + δ0 − s+ γ− − γ+,
it will not be stated explicitely for every case.
We will have to consider various different cases in order to determine optimal order
sets for pˆ, r and P1. The following charts sum up all case differentiations: For pˆ ∈ [0, 1],
r ∈ (−1, 0), P1 ∈ (0,∞), refer to case (i) and for pˆ ∈ [0, 1], r ∈ [0,∞), P1 ∈ (0,
P2
1+r ),
refer to case (v). What remains is pˆ ∈ [0, 1], r ∈ [0,∞), P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r ,∞), which splits up
into the following cases:
• For pˆ = 0:
P1 =
P2
1+r P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r , P2) P1 = P2 P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
r = 0 - - (vi) (ii)
r ∈ (0,∞) (vii) (viii) (vi) (iii)
• For pˆ ∈ (0, 1):
P1 =
P2
1+r P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r , P2) P1 = P2 P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
r = 0 - - (vi) (ii)
r ∈ (0, 1
pˆ
− 1) (vii) (viii) (ix) (iii)
r = 1
pˆ
− 1 (vii) (viii) (x) (iv)
P1 =
P2
1+r P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r ,
P2
(1+r)pˆ) P1 =
P2
(1+r)pˆ P1 ∈ (
P2
(1+r)pˆ ,∞)
r ∈ (1
pˆ
− 1,∞) (vii) (xi) (xii) (xiii)
• For pˆ = 1:
P1 =
P2
1+r P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r , P2) P1 = P2 P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
r = 0 - - (xvi) (xiv)
r ∈ (0,∞) (xvii) (xv) (xv) (xv)
(i) pˆ ∈ [0, 1], r ∈ (−1, 0), P1 ∈ (0,∞)
By stationarity we have
µ3 + µ4 = r < 0,
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which is a contradiction to dual feasibility. Thus there is no maximum. (For a
given strategy, lending more on the unsecured interbank market and investing it
into the liquid asset always yields higher return)
Os = ∅, s ∈ S
(ii) pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r = 0, P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
Then by stationarity
µ1 = 1−
P2
P1
+ µ4 > µ4 ≥ 0,
µ2 = 1− (1 + r)pˆ+ µ4 > µ4 ≥ 0
and therefore by complementary slackness β1 = γ+ = 0. Given the price parame-
ters, the objective function now is independent of the choice of γ− and δ1:
f(0, 0, γ−, δ1) = −γ− + δ1 = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s.
The resulting order sets are uncountable:
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1 = γ+ = 0}, s ∈ S.
(iii) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (0, 1
pˆ
− 1), P1 ∈ (P2,∞) or pˆ = 0, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
By stationarity,
µ1 = 1−
P2
P1
+ µ4 > µ4 ≥ 0,
µ2 = 1− (1 + r)pˆ+ µ4 > µ4 ≥ 0,
µ3 + µ4 = r > 0
and therefore by complementary slackness β1 = γ+ = 0 and (γ− = 0 ∨ δ1 = 0).
The resulting order sets are singletons:
Os = {(0, 0, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−}, s ∈ S.
(iv) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r = 1
pˆ
− 1, P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
By stationarity
µ1 = 1−
P2
P1
+ µ4 > µ4 ≥ 0,
µ3 + µ4 = r > 0,
µ3 + µ2 = r > 0
and therefore by complementary slackness β1 = 0 and (γ− = 0 ∨ δ1 = γ+ = 0).
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a) β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s > 0
The budget constraint implies
γ+ − γ− + δ1 = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s > 0.
Since γ− ≥ 0, we get γ+ + δ1 > 0 and thus γ− = 0. Again, the objective
function is constant and γ+ and δ1 can be chosen arbitrarily as long as γ+ +
δ1 = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s.
b) β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s = 0
γ+ − γ− + δ1 = 0 and the above conditions imply γ+ = γ− = δ1 = 0.
c) β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s < 0
Since γ+ − γ− + δ1 < 0 we get γ+ = δ1 = 0 and γ− = −β0
P1
P0
− δ0 + s.
The optimal order sets can be summed up in the following form for s ∈ S:
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1 = 0, γ+ ≤ (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
+, γ− = (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−}
(v) pˆ ∈ [0, 1], r ∈ [0,∞), P1 ∈ (0,
P2
1+r )
µ1 + µ3 = (1 + r)−
P2
P1
< 0,
a contradiction to dual feasibility and again we have no maximum. In this case
lending more on the unsecured interbank market and investing it into bonds always
yields higher return.
Os = ∅, s ∈ S.
(vi) pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r = 0, P1 = P2
µ2 = µ1 + 1− pˆ > µ1 ≥ 0,
which by complementary slackness means γ+ = 0.
The objective function becomes β1P1−γ−+δ1 ≡ β0
P1
P0
+δ0−s by primal feasibility.
Thus all allocations with β1P1 − γ− + δ1 = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s and β1, γ
,
−δ1 ≥ 0 are
43
5 Proofs
optimal.
Note that for s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
we get
γ− = β1P1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s︸︷︷︸
>δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0.
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : γ+ = 0}, s ∈ S.
(vii) pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ (0,∞), P1 =
P2
1+r
µ2 = µ1 + (1 + r)− (1 + r)pˆ > µ1 ≥ 0,
µ4 = µ1 + (1 + r)− 1 > µ1 ≥ 0,
which by complementary slackness means γ+ = δ1 = 0. The objective function
becomes (β1P1 − γ−)(1 + r) ≡ (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)(1 + r) by primal feasibility. Thus
all allocations with β1P1 − γ− = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s and β1, γ− ≥ 0 are optimal. Again,
for s > β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 we get
γ− = β1P1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s︸︷︷︸
>δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0.
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : γ+ = 0, β1P1 − γ− =
P1
P0
β0 + δ0 − s}, s ∈ S.
(viii) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (0, 1
pˆ
− 1], P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r , P2) or pˆ = 0, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r , P2)
µ2 = µ1 +
P2
P1
− (1 + r)pˆ > µ1 ≥ 0,
µ4 = µ1 +
P2
P1
− 1 > µ1 ≥ 0 and
µ1 + µ3 = (1 + r)−
P2
P1
> 0,
which by complementary slackness means
γ+ = δ1 = 0 ∧ (β1 = 0 ∨ γ− = 0.)
a) s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
γ− = β1P1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s︸︷︷︸
>δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0,
thus β1 = 0.
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b) s = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
γ− = β1P1,
which means γ− = β1 = 0.
c) s < δ0 + β0
P1
P0
β1P1 = γ−︸︷︷︸
≥0
+δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s︸︷︷︸
<δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0
and therefore γ− = 0, β1P1 = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s.
Os = {((
β0
P0
+
δ0
P0
−
s
P0
)+, 0, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−)}, s ∈ S.
(ix) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (0, 1
pˆ
− 1), P1 = P2 or pˆ = 0, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 = P2
µ2 = µ4 + 1− (1 + r)pˆ > µ4 ≥ 0,
µ1 + µ3 = r > 0 and
µ4 + µ3 = r > 0,
which by complementary slackness means
γ+ = 0 ∧ (β1 = δ1 = 0 ∨ γ− = 0).
a) s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
γ− = β1P1 + δ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s︸︷︷︸
>δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0,
thus β1 = δ1 = 0 and γ− = −δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s.
b) s = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
γ− = β1P1 + δ1,
which means γ− = β1 = δ1 = 0.
c) s < δ0 + β0
P1
P0
β1P1 + δ1 = γ−︸︷︷︸
≥0
+δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s︸︷︷︸
<δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0
and therefore γ− = 0. The objective function becomes β1P1 + δ1 ≡ δ0 +
β0
P1
P0
− s, thus all allocations with β1P1 + δ1 = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s and β1, δ1 ≥ 0
are optimal.
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for all s ∈ S
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1P1 ≤ (δ0+β0
P1
P0
−s)+, γ+ = 0, γ− = (δ0+β0
P1
P0
−s)−}.
(x) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r = 1
pˆ
− 1, P1 = P2
µ3 + µ1 = r > 0,
µ3 + µ2 = r > 0 and
µ3 + µ4 = r > 0,
which by complementary slackness means
γ− = 0 ∨ β1 = γ+ = δ1 = 0.
a) s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
As in (vi), by primal feasibility we get
γ− > 0,
thus
β1 = γ+ = δ1 = 0,
which means
γ− = −δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s.
b) s = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
Primal feasibility implies
β1P1 + γ+ + δ1 = γ−,
thus
β1 = γ+ = δ1 = γ− = 0.
c) s < δ0 + β0
P1
P0
Here the budget constraint implies
β1P1 + γ+ + δ1 = γ−︸︷︷︸
≥0
+δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s︸︷︷︸
<δ0+β0
P1
P0
> 0.
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Thus we get γ− = 0. The objective function becomes
β1P1 + γ+ + δ1 ≡ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s,
independent of all four variables. Thus every allocation with
β1, γ+, δ1 ≥ 0, γ− = 0
and
β1P1 + γ+ + δ1 = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s
is optimal.
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1P1 + γ+ ≤ (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)+, γ− = (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)−}.
(xi) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (1
pˆ
− 1,∞), P1 ∈ (
P2
1+r ,
P2
(1+r)pˆ)
µ2 = µ1 +
P2
P1
− (1 + r)pˆ > µ1 ≥ 0,
µ4 = µ1 +
P2
P1
− 1 > µ1 ≥ 0 and
µ1 + µ3 = (1 + r)−
P2
P1
> 0,
which by complementary slackness means
γ+ = δ1 = 0 ∧ (β1 = 0 ∨ γ− = 0).
This is the same situation as in case (viii).
Os = {((
β0
P0
+
δ0
P0
−
s
P0
)+, 0, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−)}, s ∈ S.
(xii) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (1
pˆ
− 1,∞), P1 =
P2
(1+r)pˆ
µ4 = µ1 +
P2
P1
− 1 > µ1 ≥ 0,
µ3 + µ1 = (1 + r)− (1 + r)pˆ > 0 and
µ3 + µ2 = (1 + r)− (1 + r)pˆ > 0,
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which by complementary slackness means
δ1 = 0 ∧ (γ− = 0 ∨ β1 = γ+ = 0).
Analogously to case (viii) this yields the following optimal allocations:
a) s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
β1 = γ+ = δ1 = 0,
γ− = −δ0 − β0
P1
P0
+ s.
b) s = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
β1 = γ+ = δ1 = γ− = 0.
c) s < δ0 + β0
P1
P0
Every allocation with
β1, γ+ ≥ 0, γ− = δ1 = 0
and
β1P1 + γ+ = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s.
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1P1 + γ+ = (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)+, γ− = (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)−}.
(xiii) pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ (1
pˆ
− 1,∞), P1 ∈ (
P2
(1+r)pˆ ,∞)
µ1 = µ2 + (1 + r)pˆ−
P2
P1
> µ2 ≥ 0,
µ4 = µ2 + (1 + r)pˆ− 1 > µ2 ≥ 0,
µ2 + µ3 = (1 + r)(1− pˆ) > 0,
therefore β1 = δ1 = 0 and (γ+ = 0 ∨ γ− = 0).
Os = {(0, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
+, (β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s)
−)}, s ∈ S.
48
(xiv) pˆ = 1, r = 0, P1 ∈ (P2,∞)
µ1 = µ2 + (1 + r)−
P2
P1
> µ2 ≥ 0,
therefore β1 = 0. The objective function becomes constant, thus
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1 = 0}, s ∈ S.
(xv) pˆ = 1, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 ∈ (
P2
(1+r) ,∞)
µ1 = µ2 + (1 + r)−
P2
P1
> µ2 ≥ 0,
µ4 = µ2 + (1 + r)− 1 > µ2 ≥ 0,
therefore β1 = δ1 = 0. Again, the objective function becomes constant, thus
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1 = 0, γ+ − γ− =
P1
P0
β0 + δ0 − s}, s ∈ S.
(xvi) pˆ = 1, r = 0, P1 = P2
The objective function directly becomes constant, thus Os = Cs for all s ∈ S.
(xvii) pˆ = 1, r ∈ (0,∞), P1 =
P2
(1+r)
µ4 = µ1 + (1 + r)− 1 > µ2 ≥ 0,
therefore δ1 = 0. The objective function becomes constant, thus
Os = {(β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ C
s : β1P1 + γ+ − γ− =
P1
P0
β0 + δ0 − s}, s ∈ S.
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Proof of 3.2. Now we prove Theorem 3.2 by looking for optimal assignments. By defini-
ton, (r, P1) is an equilibirum price pair iff there is an optimal assignment. Since we now
have to check the market clearing conditions, the initial endowment is important and
we have to make case differentiations accordingly. All equations containing the liquidity
demand s are to be considered P Y -a.s..
First, let δ0 < E(Y ) and assume there is an optimal assignment. Thus by definiton
a(s) ∈ Os ⊂ Cs, in particular a1(s)P1 + a2(s)− a3(s) ≤ β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s. We have
E[a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y )− a3(Y )] ≤ E[β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − Y ] = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − E[Y ] < β0
P1
P0
,
in contradiction to
E[a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y )− a3(Y )] = β0
P1
P0
,
which can be derived directly by applying the market clearing conditions E[a2(Y )] =
E[a3(Y )] and E[a1(Y )] = E[h1(Y )] =
β0
P0
. Thus there is neither interbank lending nor
trading of bonds, thus banks with δ0 < s fail. The remaining banks can only put their
spare liquidity in the liquid asset. This implies
(βs1, γ
s
+, γ
s
−, δ
s
1) = (
β0
P0
, 0, 0, δ0 − s).
The terminal wealth of a bank facing liquidity demand s ≤ δ0 is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
Now let δ0 = E(Y ) and β0 > 0, consider the cases (i) to (xvi) from above. We do
not have to check each of the seventeen cases from the proof of 3.1 individually. We can
group them in five categories:
• Cases (i) and (v)
Since Os = ∅ for all s ∈ S, there is no optimal assignment.
• Cases (ii), (iii), (iv), (xiii), (xiv) and (xv)
For all s ∈ S and for all (β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ O
s we have β1 = 0. Assume there is an
optimal assignment, then a(s) ∈ Os for every s ∈ S implies
E[a1(Y )] = 0,
which is a contradiction to β0 > 0 and the market clearing condition E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
. Again, there is no optimal assignment.
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• Cases (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) and (xi)
This means pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ [0,∞) and P1 ∈ [
P2
1+r , P2]∩ [
P2
1+r ,
P2
(1+r)pˆ) (where for pˆ = 0,
P2
(1+r)pˆ = +∞).
For all s ∈ S and for all (β1, γ+, γ−) ∈ O
s we have γ+ = 0. Also, for s > δ0+ β0
P1
P0
we have γ− > 0.
Assume P
(
Y > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
)
> 0 and let a be an optimal assignment. Then
E[a2(Y )] = 0 and E[a3(Y )] > 0,
a contradiction to the market clearing condition E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )]. This means
that in order to find an optimal assignment in these cases we have to assume
Y ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
P-a.s..
In cases (viii) and (xi), all order sets Os consist of only one element
Os = {(
δ0
P1
+
β0
P0
−
s
P1
, 0, 0)}
and assigning exactly those amounts accords with both market clearing conditions:
E[a1(Y )] =
δ0
P1
+
β0
P0
−
E(Y )
P1
=
β0
P0
,
E[a2(Y )] = 0 = E[a3(Y )].
We get
a(s) = (
δ0
P1
+
β0
P0
−
s
P1
, 0, 0). (5.1)
In cases (vi), (vii) and (ix), the market clearing condition demands
E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )] = 0,
thus by a2(s) ≥ 0 we get a2 ≡ 0. In case (vii), this results directly in the unique
optimal assignment (5.1).
In cases (vi), we apply the budget constraint:
a1(s)P1 = a1(s)P1 + a2(s)− a3(s) ≤ β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − s,
which also holds in case (ix). By the market clearing conditions we get
E[a1(Y )P1] = E[a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y )− a3(Y )] = β0
P1
P0
= E[β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − Y ],
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thus a1(s)P1 = β0
P1
P0
+δ0−s for all s ∈ S. Therefore, the unique optimal assignment
is again given by (5.1)
There is no trading on the unsecured interbank market. Therefore pˆ and r can be
chosen arbitrarily (they do not matter anymore regarding optimization). Also, pˆ
doesn’t have to be checked for consistency. What remains is two conditions on P1:
P1 ∈ (0, P2] and ess sup Y ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
, which means
P1 ∈
[
P0
ess sup Y − E(Y )
β0
, P2
]
.
This is possible, iff β0 ≥ (ess sup Y − E(Y ))
P0
P2
> 0.
The investment in the liquid asset is given by
δ1 =
P1
P0
β0 − a1(s)P1 + δ0 − s+ a3(s)− a2(s) = 0
for all s ∈ S.
Thus, the terminal wealth of a banking facing liquidity demand s = λc1 is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ (
δ0
P1
+
β0
P0
−
s
P1
)P2 − (1−
s
c1
)c2
= α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0
P2
P1
− s
P2
P1
− (1−
s
c1
)c2
= α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ (E(Y )− s)
P2
P1
− (1−
s
c1
)c2(
= α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ (E(Λ)− λ)c1
P2
P1
− (1− λ)c2
)
• Cases (x) and (xii)
This means pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ [1
pˆ
− 1,∞) and P1 =
P2
(1+r)pˆ or pˆ = 1, r ∈ (0,∞) and
P1 =
P2
1+r . For s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
we directly get
a1(s) = a2(s) = 0, a3(s) = s− δ0 − β0
P1
P0
.
In case (x), we have a1(s)P1 + a2(s) ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s and by the market clearing
conditions
E[a1(Y )P1+a2(Y )] = E[a1(Y )P1+a2(Y )−a3(Y )]+E[a3(Y )] = β0
P1
P0
+E[a3(Y )]
= β0
P1
P0
+E[(Y − δ0−β0
P1
P0
)1
{Y >δ0+β0
P1
P0
}
]
EY=δ0= E[(δ0+β0
P1
P0
−Y )1
{Y≤δ0+β0
P1
P0
}
].
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Since
E[a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y )] = E[(a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y ))1{Y≤δ0+β0 P1P0 }
],
this implies a1(s)P1 + a2(s) = δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s for all s ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
. This equation
also holds for case (xii). In both cases, an optimal assignment is characterized by
a1(s)P1 + a2(s) = (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)+, a3(s) = (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)−, E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
.
The investment in the liquid asset is given by
δ1 =
P1
P0
β0 − a1(s)P1 + δ0 − s+ a3(s)− a2(s) = 0
for all s ∈ S.
Note that if P
(
Y > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
)
= 0, there is no unsecured lending and the results
are as in cases (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) and (xi). In particular, the optimal assignment
is unique. Else, we get multiple solutions. Applying P1 =
P2
(1+r)pˆ (⇐⇒ (1+ r)pˆ =
P2
P1
) , we get for the terminal wealth of a banking facing liquidity demand s:
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ a1(s)P2 + a2(s)(1 + r)pˆ− a3(s)(1 + r)− (1−
s
c1
)c2
= α
St2
S0
+ (a1(s)P1 + a2(s))
P2
P1
− a3(s)
P2
P1pˆ
− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
For a bank facing liquidity demand s ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
this results in
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)
P2
P1
− (1−
s
c1
)c2
= α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ (E(Y )− s)
P2
P1
− (1−
s
c1
)c2
And for s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
we get
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
− (s− δ0 − β0
P1
P0
)
P2
P1pˆ
− (1−
s
c1
)c2
= α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0pˆ
+ (E(Y )− s)
P2
P1pˆ
− (1−
s
c1
)c2
• Cases (xvi) and (xvii)
This means pˆ = 1, r ∈ [0,∞) and P1 =
P2
1+r . In case (xvi), we get
E[
P1
P0
β0 + δ0 − Y − a1(Y )P1 + a3(Y )− a2(Y )] = 0
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by market clearing and δ0 = E(Y ). Together with a(s) ∈ O
s, this implies
P1
P0
β0 + δ0 − s = a1(s)P1 + a2(s)− a3(s). (∗)
The same holds in case (xvii). In particular, δ1 = 0. All assignments with
E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
, E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )] and (∗) are optimal. For a bank facing
liquidity demand s, this results in
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ (δ0 − s)(1 + r)− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
Next, let δ0 > E(Y ) and β0 > 0. Since many of the arguments are the same as in the
correspondent cases for δ0 = E(Y ), we can keep the proofs shorter. As above, we can
show that in the cases (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (xiii), (xiv) and (xv) there is no optimal
assignment.
• Cases (vii), (viii), (xi), (xii) and (xvii)
Assume, there is an optimal assignment. Then a(s) ∈ Os, thus
E[a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y )− a3(Y )] = E[β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − Y ] = β0
P1
P0
+ δ0 − E[Y ] > β0
P1
P0
.
But the market clearing conditions imply
E[a1(Y )P1 + a2(Y )− a3(Y )] = E[a1(Y )P1] = β0
P1
P0
,
a contradiction.
• Cases (vi) and (ix)
This means pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ [0, 1
pˆ
− 1) and P1 = P2 (where for pˆ = 0,
1
pˆ
− 1 = +∞).
For P
(
Y > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
)
> 0 there is no optimal assignment, following the same
arguments as above. Again we get, a2(s) = a3(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. In case (vi),
the budget constraint implies a1(s)P1 ≤ δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s, which also holds in case
(ix). The resulting optimal assignments are characterized by
a2(s) = a3(s) = 0, a1(s) ≤
δ0
P1
+
β0
P0
−
s
P1
, E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
.
The investment in the liquid asset is given by
δ1 =
P1
P0
β0 − a1(s)P1 + δ0 − s+ a3(s)− a2(s) =
P1
P0
β0 + δ0 − a1(s)P1 − s.
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There is no trading on the unsecured interbank market, pˆ and r can be chosen
arbitrarily. The resulting terminal wealth of a banking facing liquidity demand s
is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
• Case (x)
This means pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r = 1
pˆ
− 1 and P1 = P2. Optimal assignments are charac-
terized by
a3(s) = 0, a1(s)P2 + a2(s) ≤ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
− s, for s ≤ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
,
a1(s) = a2(s) = 0, a3(s) = s− δ0 − β0
P2
P0
, for s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
,
E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
, E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )].
The investment in the liquid asset is given by
δ1 =

 β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − a1(s)P2 − a2(s)− s, s ≤ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
,
0, s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
.
The terminal wealth of a banking facing liquidity demand s ≤ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2,
and a banking facing liquidity demand s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
has terminal wealth
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+
(
β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − s
)
1
pˆ
− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
• Case (xvi)
This means pˆ = 1, r = 0 and P1 = P2. All assignments with E[a1(Y )] =
β0
P0
,
E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )] and a(s) ∈ O
s for all s ∈ S are optimal assignments. The
terminal wealth, given liquidity demand s, is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
Technically, for β0 = 0 there is only lending and 0 goods on the market. But the above
results also hold (they were derived for β0 ≥ 0), i.e. instead of deriving optimal order
sets on a market without bond trade, we formally allow trade of bonds but demand
E[a1(Y )] = 0. Thus we assume δ0 = E(Y ) and β0 = 0. There is no optimal assignment
in the cases (i) and (v).
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• Cases (vii), (viii) and (xi)
Assume, there is an optimal assignment a. Then for all s ∈ S a2(s) = 0. The
second market clearing condition E[a3(Y )] = E[a2(Y )] = 0 implies a3 ≡ 0. By the
first market clearing condition E[a1(Y )] = 0 we have a1 ≡ 0. But then, in all three
cases, the condition a(s) ∈ Os for all s ∈ S is violated.
• Cases (ii), (iii), (vi) and (ix)
Again, a2(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S, thus a3 ≡ 0. This can hold only if Y ≤ δ0+β0
P1
P0
= δ0
P-a.s.. This is a contradiction to δ0 = E(Y ), since Y is assumed not to be constant.
• Cases (iv), (x), (xii) and (xiii)
This means pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ [1
pˆ
− 1,∞) and P1 ∈ [
P2
(1+r)pˆ ,∞). In case (x) and (xii),
we derive a1 ≡ 0 with the first market clearing condition. In case (iv) and (x) we
now have a2(s) ≤ (δ0 − s)
+ for all s ∈ S. The second market clearing condition
implies
E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )] = E[(δ0 − Y )
−] = E[(δ0 − Y )
+].
The last equation holds, because E[δ0 − Y ] = δ0 − E(Y ) = 0. This concludes
a2(s) = (δ0 − s)
+ for all s ∈ S. This also holds in cases (xii) and (xiii), thus we
can characterize an optimal assignment by
a1(s) = 0, a2(s) = (δ0 − s)
+ and a3(s) = (δ0 − s)
− for all s ∈ S.
We get δ1 = 0 for all s ∈ S. Applying 1 = α+ β0 + δ0 = α+ E(Y ) yields
V2(α, β0, δ0) =

 (1−E(Y ))
St2
S0
+ (E(Y )−s)(1 + r)pˆ− (1− s
c1
)c2, s ≤ E(Y )
(1−E(Y ))
St2
S0
+ (E(Y )−s)(1 + r)− (1− s
c1
)c2, s > E(Y )
• Cases (xiv), (xv), (xvi) and (xvii)
This means pˆ = 1, r ∈ [0,∞) and P1 ∈ [
P2
1+r ,∞). We can show a1 ≡ 0 using the
first market clearing condition. In case (xiv) and (xvi) we use a(s) ∈ Os ⊂ Cs to
show a2(s)− a3(s) ≤ δ0 − s. Applying
E[a2(Y )− a3(Y )] = 0 = E[δ0 − Y ]
yields a2(s) − a3(s) = δ0 − s. The same holds for the cases (xv) and (xvii). An
optimal assignment is characterized by
a1(s) = 0 and a2(s)− a3(s) = E(Y )− s, for all s ∈ S.
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Terminal wealth is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ β0
P2
P0
+ (δ0 − s)(1 + r)− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
Finally, let δ0 > E(Y ) and β0 = 0. The cases (i), (v), (vii), (viii) and (xi) can
be treated as for δ0 = E(Y ) and β0 = 0, where we showed that there is no optimal
assignment.
• Cases (ii), (iii), (vi) and (ix)
This means pˆ ∈ [0, 1), r ∈ [0, 1
pˆ
− 1) and P1 ∈ [P2,∞). For an optimal assignment
we have a2 ≡ 0, thus a3 ≡ 0. This can hold only if ess sup Y ≤ δ0. In this case
the optimal assignment is given by a ≡ (0, 0, 0) and the investment in the liquid
asset is δ1 = δ0 − s. This yields terminal wealth of
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
• Cases (xii), (xiii), (xv) and (xvii)
By the market clearing conditions, we get 0 = E[a1(Y ) + a2(Y ) − a3(Y )], which
by a(s) ∈ Os turns into
0 = E[δ0 − Y ] = δ0 − E(Y ) > 0,
a contradiction.
• Cases (iv) and (x)
This means pˆ ∈ (0, 1), r = 1
pˆ
− 1 and P1 ∈ [P2,∞). a1 ≡ 0 is clear. For s > δ0
we get a2(s) = 0, a3(s) = δ0 − s and therefore δ1 = 0. For s ≤ δ0, a3(s) = 0.
Thus a2(s) ≤ δ0 − s and δ1 = δ0 − s − a2(s). a is an optimal assignment iff
E[a2(Y )] = E[Y 1{Y >δ0}]− δ0P (Y > δ0) and for all s ∈ S
a1(s) = 0, 0 ≤ a2(s) ≤ (δ0 − s)
+, a3(s) = (δ0 − s)
−.
Terminal wealth is
V2(α, β0, δ0) =

 α
St2
S0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2, s ≤ δ0
α
St2
S0
+ (δ0 − s)
1
pˆ
− (1− s
c1
)c2, s > δ0
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• Cases (xiv) and (xvi)
This means pˆ = 1, r = 0 and P1 ∈ [P2,∞). a is an optimal assignment iff
E[a2(Y )] = E[a3(Y )] and for all s ∈ S
a1(s) = 0, a2(s) ≥ 0, a3(s) ≥ 0, a2(s)− a3(s) ≤ δ0 − s.
Furthermore, δ1 = δ0 − s+ a3(s)− a2(s) and terminal wealth is
V2(α, β0, δ0) = α
St2
S0
+ δ0 − s− (1−
s
c1
)c2.
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Proof of 3.3. For a3(s) = (δ0+β0
P2
P0
− s)− and (a1(s)+ a2(s))a3(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S, we
get
Rs,x(p,
1
p
− 1, P2, a) =


(s− δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)1
p
, V
s,x
2 (α, β0, δ0) ≥ 0, s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
,
(α x
S0
− (1− s
c1
)c2)
+, V
s,x
2 (α, β0, δ0) < 0, s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
,
0, s ≤ δ0 + β0
P2
P0
.
with V s,x2 (α, β0, δ0) = α
x
S0
− (s− δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)1
p
− (1− s
c1
)c2 for s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
.
Thus
E
[
RY,St2 (p,
1
p
−1, P2, a)
]
=
1
p
E
[(
Y −δ0−β0
P2
P0
)
1
{α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2≥(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
,Y >δ0+β0
P2
P0
}
]
+E
[(
α
St2
S0
−(1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
,Y >δ0+β0
P2
P0
}
]
=
1
p
E
[(
Y − δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)
1
{α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2≥(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
>0}
]
+E
[(
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
}
]
.
We will show that h is monotonely increasing on [0, 1]. By definition, h(p) ≥ 0 = h(0)
for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Let 0 < p < q ≤ 1, then
h(p)E
[
(δ0 + β0
P2
P0
− Y )−
]
= pE
[
RY,St2 (p,
1
p
− 1, P2, a)
]
= E
[(
Y − δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)
1
{α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2≥(Y−δ0+β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
>0}
]
+pE
[(
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
}
]
= E
[(
Y − δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)
1
{α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2≥(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
>0}
]
+pE
[(
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
q
}
]
+pE
[(
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0<(Y−δ0+β0
P2
P0
) 1
q
≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
}
]
≤ E
[(
Y − δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)
1
{α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2≥(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
>0}
]
+qE
[(
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
q
}
]
+pE
[
1
p
(
Y − δ0 + β0
P2
P0
)
1
{0<(Y−δ0+β0
P2
P0
) 1
q
≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
p
}
]
59
5 Proofs
= E
[(
Y − δ0 − β0
P2
P0
)
1
{α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2≥(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
q
>0}
]
+qE
[(
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2
)
1
{0≤α
St2
S0
−(1− Y
c1
)c2<(Y−δ0−β0
P2
P0
) 1
q
}
]
= qE
[
RY,St2 (q,
1
q
− 1, P2, a)
]
= h(q)E
[
(δ0 − β0
P2
P0
− Y )−
]
.
Define a [0, 1]-sequence (pn)n∈N0 by
p0 := 1, pn := h
n(1), n ∈ N.
Then obviously for n ∈ N0 we have pn+1 = h(pn) and the sequence (pn)n∈N0 is monotone,
since p1 ≤ 1 = p0 and pn ≤ pn−1 implies pn+1 = h(pn) ≤ h(pn−1) = pn. Since (pn)n∈N0
is bounded, the monotone convergence theorem for sequences of real numbers implies
that the sequence is convergent. We define
p := lim
n→∞
pn = lim
n→∞
hn(1).
By the representation of h(p) we derived above, it is clear that p only depends on
(α, β0, δ0).
Using this representation again and applying that the sequence (pn)n∈N0 is mono-
tonely decreasing, monotone convergence (Beppo Levi) implies h(p) = h(limn→∞ pn) =
limn→∞ h(pn) = p.
Finally, assume, there is p˜ > p with h(p˜) = p˜. Then p0 = 1 and pn ↓ p imply that
there are k,m ∈ N with m > k and pk > p˜ > pm. Then pm = h
m−k(pk) ≥ h
m−k(p˜) = p˜
by monotonicity of h, which is a contradiction. Therefore, p is the largest fixpoint of
h:
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Proof of 3.4. First assume, that p > 0. Then by theorem 3.2, r = 1
p
− 1 and P1 = P2
are equilibrium prices. A corresponding market clearing assignment is (not necessarily
uniquely) given by a ∈ A, a3(s) = (δ0+β0
P2
P0
− s)− and a1(s)+ a2(s) ≤ (δ0+β0
P2
P0
− s)+
for all s ∈ S. In this market, the real redemption rate (see definition 2.5) is given by
p˜ = h(p) = p.
Thus, (p, 1
p
− 1, P2, a) is a consistent quadruple.
Now, let (pˆ, r, P1, a) be a consistent quadruple. Remember that we only consider the
case δ0 ≥ EY and δ0 + β0
P2
P0
< Y . Therefore, pˆ > 0.
• pˆ = 1
This means
E
[
RY,St2 (1, r, P1, a)
]
E [a3(Y )(1 + r)]
= 1.
Since 0 ≤ Rs,x(1, r, P1, a) ≤ a3(s)(1 + r), this implies
RY,St2 (1, r, P1, a) = a3(Y )(1 + r).
By definition of Rs,x, this implies for all x ∈ supp(St2)
α
x
S0
+a1(s)P2+a2(s)(1+r)−a3(s)(1+r)+δ1(s)−(1−
s
c1
)c2 ≥ 0 for all s : a3(s) > 0.
In particular,
α
x
S0
+a1(s)P2+a2(s)(1+r)−a3(s)(1+r)+δ1(s)−(1−
s
c1
)c2 ≥ 0 for s > δ0+β0
P1
P0
,
since all assignments satisfy a3(s) > 0 for s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
(see the definition of
A1, . . . , A6, A8 and A9 in theorem 3.2).
Looking at possible equilibrium prices, also given by theorem 3.2, we have for
β0 > 0
r ≥ 0 and P1 =
P2
1 + r
.
This implies for all β0 ≥ 0
β0
P1
P0
= β0
P2
P0(1 + r)
≤ β0
P2
P0
and
a1(s)P2 = a1(s)P1
P2
P1
= a1(s)P1(1 + r),
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since a1 ≡ 0 for β0 = 0 (see A1, . . . , A4).
Applying r ≥ 0 and δ1(s) =
P1
P0
β0 − a1(s)P1 + δ0 − s− a2(s) + a3(s), (see proof of
3.1), we get
a1(s)P2 + a2(s)(1 + r)− a3(s)(1 + r) + δ1(s) ≤ (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)(1 + r).
This yields
α
x
S0
+ (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)(1 + r)− (1−
s
c1
)c2 ≥ 0 for s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
and thus
α
x
S0
+ (δ0 + β0
P2
P0
− s)− (1−
s
c1
)c2 ≥ 0 for s > δ0 + β0
P2
P0
.
Thus, by definition of h, we have h(1) = 1 and thus p = 1.
• 0 < pˆ < 1
For the assignments, we only have to consider A1, A3, A5 and A8. Thus a3 is
uniquely determined by
a3(s) = (δ0 + β0
P1
P0
− s)− for all s ∈ S
and a1(s) = a2(s) = 0 for s > δ0 + β0
P1
P0
. Assume p = 0. Thus RY,St2 (p, 1
p
−
1, P2, a) ≡ 0, where a satisfies a3(s) = (δ0+β0
P2
P0
−s)− and (a1(s)+a2(s))a3(s) = 0
for all s ∈ S. This is equivalent to
(α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2)1Y >δ0+β0 P2P0
≤ 0, P-a.s.
Since we assumed δ0 + β0
P2
P0
< Y , this implies
αS − (1−
Y
c1
)c2) ≤ 0.
Therefore,
α
St2
S0
− (1−
Y
c1
)c2 ≤ 0, P-a.s.
ans thus
RY,St2 (pˆ, r, P1, a)
P-a.s.
= 0.
But then
pˆ =
E
[
RY,St2 (pˆ, r, P1, a)
]
E [a3(Y )(1 + r)]
= 0,
a contradiction.
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